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Abstract: Financial stability is an important policy objective since crises are associated with big economic, 
social, and political costs. Promoting stability requires preventing “sudden stops” in capital flows, which 
are events in which foreign financing abruptly disappears. This paper contributes to the discussion by 
providing new theoretical and empirical evidence on the causal connection between lack of exposure to 
commercial trade and proclivity to sudden stops. On the theoretical front, I show how exposure to trade 
raises the creditworthiness of countries and reduces the probability of sudden stops. In relatively closed 
economies, sudden stops (when they occur) are more harmful, and thus the option to default on the 
inherited debt is more attractive. Therefore, conditional on the amount that lenders are willing to loan, 
decreased exposure to trade increases the likelihood of default. A sudden stop takes place when the 
borrowers reject the amount that lenders want to loan: They receive no new funding, and they 
concurrently default on the outstanding debt to “ease the pain.” This proposition is tested using “gravity 
estimates,” which are based on countries’ geographic characteristics as appropriate instruments for trade. 
The results indicate that, all else equal, a 10 percentage point decrease in the trade-to-gross domestic 
product ratio increases the probability of a sudden stop between 30 percent and 40 percent. The policy 
implications are unambiguous: Increasing the tradable component of a country’s GDP will, ceteris paribus, 
reduce the vulnerability of that country to sudden stops in capital flows. 
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 I. Introduction 
When foreign financing available to countries abruptly disappears, a phenomenon 
that in the economic literature is called “sudden stops,”
2 countries are forced to go through 
a potentially painful resource transfer to creditor countries. When this happens, any 
outstanding current account deficit, previously financed with foreign capital inflows, has to 
be eliminated or financed with international reserve losses. Either option amounts to a net 
resource transfer to creditor countries. The size of the transfer is an increasing function of 
the current account deficit before the shock. Less obviously, the cost in terms of output loss 
of generating a current account adjustment is a decreasing function of exposure to trade 
(i.e. structural trade to GDP ratio).
3 Recent papers on sudden stops, most prominently 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003) and Edwards (2004), have shown that there is a positive 
correlation between lack of exposure to trade (in what follows, I shall refer to this as 
closedness) and the occurrence of sudden stops. Yet, due to the potential endogeneity of 
trade, causality has not been firmly established.
4 Furthermore, the theoretical 
underpinnings of the relationships have remained unexplored. The purpose of this paper is 
to provide new theoretical and empirical evidence on the causal relationship between lack 
of exposure to trade and sudden stops.  
What is the link between trade and sudden stops? Any resource transfer operating 
through a current account adjustment requires a change in the real exchange rate, the 
relative price of traded to non-traded goods.
5 A real exchange rate depreciation will induce 
a substitution in domestic consumption away from the traded and into the non-traded 
goods. Similarly, it will induce a substitution in production in the opposite direction. Both 
effects will generate the foreign exchange needed to re-establish external equilibrium by 
                                                 
2 To the best of my knowledge, the expression “Sudden Stops” was first used by Dornbusch, Goldfajn and 
Valdes (1995) and has since become increasingly popular. The first analytic approach to the problem of 
sudden stops is Calvo (1998).  
3 Note that “Sudden Stops” are financial shocks to the capital account that cause an adjustment in the current 
account or/and a change in reserves. This approach is somewhat novel since much of the previous analysis 
deals with the reverse causality: current account shocks that cause an adjustment in the capital account and/or 
reserves. See Bergin (2004) for a review of the literature. 
4 The exceptions are Cavallo and Frankel (2004) which is an extension of this paper with some additional 
results and a broader scope of analysis, and Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003) who deal with the problem of 
endogeneity of trade by computing two-step hierarchical bootstrapped confidence intervals for all variables in 
the model. 
5 Honoring my roots, I define the real exchange rate in the Latin tradition, as the relative price of traded goods 




reducing the current account deficit. In the theoretical model outlined in this paper, it is 
shown that in financially constrained countries—those countries that have only limited 
access to foreign financing— the magnitude of the required real exchange rate depreciation 
(in short, “real depreciation”) for a given quantity of resource transfer is unambiguously a 
decreasing function of exposure to trade.
6 Furthermore, in these financially constrained 
economies, real depreciations are recessionary because of the adverse effects of weaker 
exchange rates on the country’s balance sheets.
7 Thus, lack of exposure to trade, by 
increasing the size of the real depreciation in the aftermath of a shock, also increases the 
ensuing output contraction.  
Sudden stops, if they occur, can be quite harmful, especially in closed economies. 
In order to circumvent the pain, countries that face a sudden stop might be tempted to 
default on their external obligations. In the second part of the model, sudden stops are 
endogenized. They happen when the borrowers simultaneously choose to reject the amount 
that they are offered by foreign lenders and to default on the inherited debt. As sudden 
stops (when they happen) are more harmful in relatively closed economies, and default on 
the inherited debt provides relief, any given offer from lenders is more likely to be rejected 
in closed economies, making sudden stops more likely. Interestingly, there are additional 
connections between the temptation to default on external debts and lack of exposure to 
trade that reinforce the conjectured link. Rose (2002) shows that debt default and 
subsequent renegotiations reduce bilateral trade between creditors and debtors.
8 To the 
extent that trade comprises a large part of a country’s economic activities, that country will 
have less incentives to default, and sudden stops should be less likely.
9  
                                                 
6 The quantity of resource transfer is the outstanding current account deficit before the shock. 
7 This relates to the so-called “balance sheet” effect of real depreciations, where mismatches in the currency 
denomination of assets and liabilities can lead to massive bankruptcies. Analytical literature on balance sheet 
effects and output contraction includes: Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krugman (1999), Aghion, Banerjee and 
Bacchetta (2000), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002), Christiano, 
Gust and Roldos (2004) and Mendoza (2002). On the empirical side, Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri and Roubini 
(2002) and Guidotti, Sturzenneger and Villar (2004) provide evidence on the importance of these effects. 
8 Rose (2002) provides evidence of the importance of this channel. He shows that when a country defaults on 
its debt, the decline in bilateral trade with creditors is approximately 8% a year and persists for around 15 
years. 
9 The point was originally made by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). They argue that countries that trade more are 





The borrowers’ temptation to default can be driven by a variety of things, but the 
previous discussion makes it clear that one structural element is the country’s exposure to 
trade. All in all, countries with less exposure should be more prone to sudden stops. 
Tempting as it might be to jump right in and test this proposition empirically, one has to be 
very careful in considering the potential endogeneity of (or reverse causality between) 
trade, financial openness, and one of its plausible outcomes: sudden stops.
10 Aizenman 
(2003) shows in the setting of a simple model how more commercial openness increases 
the effective cost of enforcing financial repression, making financial openness a by-product 
of greater trade integration. Similarly one could potentially think of a reverse causality 
process, whereby for example, greater financial openness may reduce the cost of trade 
credit and encourage FDI, and both adjustments may facilitate more commercial trade. 
More recently, Aizenman and Noy (2004) investigate the presence of two-way feedbacks 
between financial and trade integration and present evidence on the existence of such 
connections. Thus, it is possible that countries that are less prone to sudden stops for 
reasons other than trade (i.e., a long tradition of financial openness and reliability) trade 
more. To deal with this identification problem, I use “gravity estimates” as instrumental 
variable for trade.  
The methodology of using “gravity estimates” as instrumental variables is an 
intuitive two-stage procedure developed by Frankel and Romer (1999) in the context of 
their research on trade and growth, and later applied to a variety of settings in which trade 
and some other variable could be jointly determined.
11 The first stage consists of 
aggregating up across a country’s partners the prediction of a gravity equation that explains 
bilateral trade with distance, population, language, land-border, land-area, and landlocked 
status. In the second stage, this predicted trade variable is used as an instrument for actual 
trade in an equation of sudden stops. Gravity estimates are a good instrumental variable 
because they are based on geographical variables (which are plausibly exogenous) yet 
                                                 
10 Evidently, some degree of financial openness is a necessary condition for sudden stops; the easiest way to 
avoid sudden stops is to remain isolated from foreign capital inflows. This is true independently from 
commercial trade patterns. The hypothesis tested in this paper is that once capital inflows are allowed, then 
closedness becomes an important determinant of the stability of foreign capital inflows.  
11 See for example: Frankel and Rose (2002) where they show that currency unions might raise trade and 




when aggregated across all bilateral trading partners they are highly correlated with a 
country’s overall trade.   
I use financial account and current account information for all countries in the 
world with available data in the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)—141 countries 
in total— for the period 1970-2002, to statistically identify sudden stops in capital flows. A 
sudden stop episode is defined as taking place in a country during the year in which there is 
a noticeable reduction in the current account deficit that is driven by a disruptive (i.e. 
accompanied by a fall in real output) reduction in foreign capital inflows.
12 Then, the 
Frankel and Rose (2002) dataset is used to compute gravity estimates for each country in 
the sample.  
Using a stacked cross-section (141 countries between 1970 and 2002), controlling 
for other possible determinants of sudden stops, and using the instrumental variables 
technique described above, I show that lack of exposure to trade is indeed a powerful 
predictor of these capital account shocks. Moving from Australia’s average trade share 
(approximately 30% of GDP) to Argentina’s current trade share (approximately 20% of 
GDP), increases the probability of a sudden stop between 30% and 40%. This result could 
be counterintuitive: more closedness does not “shield” countries from the volatility of 
world markets. On the contrary, by reducing the creditworthiness of countries, more 
closedness leads to greater vulnerability to sudden stops.  
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I introduce the model and 
establish the link between closedness and real depreciations, real depreciations and the ex-
post output cost of sudden stops, and the ex-post cost of sudden stop and their ex-ante 
probability. In section III, I explain the methodology to be used in seeking to test the main 





                                                 
12 A reduction in the financial account surplus could potentially be the optimal response to positive terms of 
trade shocks. To rule out these as crises episodes, I require that a sudden stop be accompanied by output 
contraction. As a matter of fact, this assumption is not essential for the results and I later show that all the 




II. Closedness and Sudden Stops: An Analytic Approach 
There are two main hypotheses supporting the conjecture that closedness causes 
sudden stops. The first one is that real depreciations can be costly in terms of output loss. I 
show that this is true for a sub-set of countries, which will be defined as “financially 
constrained.” The second hypothesis is that countries with more closedness undergo larger 
real depreciations and more output loss in the aftermath of sudden stops. Putting these 
pieces together and modeling sudden stops as endogenous crises that occur when the 
lenders don’t extend new financing, and the borrowers simultaneously default on the 
inherited debt to “ease the pain,” leads to the main theoretical prediction of the model: 
those countries with more closedness are (ceteris paribus) more prone to sudden stops.  
In a world with perfect capital mobility and no financial-market imperfections, real 
depreciations are expansionary. In fact, in models in the Mundell-Fleming tradition, real 
depreciations (and even devaluations) have standard demand-switching effects that aid the 
recovery in the aftermath of negative external shocks. But a world of perfect capital 
mobility and no imperfections is one in which capital should flow to where it is relatively 
scarce and, therefore, where relatively poor countries could sustain prolonged periods of 
current account deficits. This is clearly not empirically true. Financial imperfections 
abound everywhere and capital mobility is far from perfect. Here, a simple model in the 
tradition of Krugman (1999) and Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2003) is presented where 
financial imperfections limit the entrepreneur’s capacity to borrow internationally, and 
where all international debt is denominated in foreign currency. The latter assumption 
introduces the “balance sheet” phenomena into the model, by allowing for a perverse 
feedback from real depreciations to investment and real output by increasing the cost of 
debt repayment. 
1)  The Model  
There are two periods, t=0 and t+1=1, and two domestic actors, the workers, who 
consume a mixture of imported (Mt) and home-produced (CNt) goods in every period, and 
the entrepreneurs, who invest in period t, retire in period t+1, and consume their wealth 
only at retirement. Consumers (the workers), maximize the following intertemporal Cobb-













⎧ ⎫ ⎪ ⎪ β= β ⎨ ⎬
γ1 − γ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩⎭
∑∑    (1) 
subject to budget constraint, 
Nt t t t CP M W +≤  (2) 
where 0<γ<1; β>0 is the inter-temporal discount factor;  ( / ) tM t N t PP P =  is the real exchange 
rate;  and Wt is real income (wages) denominated in domestic goods units. I make the 
simplifying and innocuous assumption that labor is inelastically supplied and that each 
worker is endowed and supplies exactly one unit of labor in every period.  
















Normalizing 1 Mt P =  in both periods, then (3) simplifies to: 
() tN t CPI P
γ−1 =                                                (4) 
Using (4) I can re-write (2) in terms of the CPI to get: 
()
1
Nt t PC W
γ− =  (5) 
where the equal sign replaces the inequality because I rule out the plausibility of savings 
(domestic or foreign) on the part of workers and/or non-interior solutions. This expression 
says that the value of total consumption is equal to real wages. 
2)  Consumption 
Workers solve their intra-temporal consumption problem by maximizing (1) subject 
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=  (7) 
where  t RER  is the real exchange rate. 
3)  Production 





tt t YK L
α− α =  (8) 
 
where, 0 < α < 1,  t K  is the capital stock comprised only of domestic goods, and t L  is labor 
input.  Given the assumed characteristics of labor supply, I set 1 t L ≡ . Therefore, (8) 
simplifies to:  
tt YK
α =  (9) 
The representative home firm’s problem is to maximize profits given by: 
ttt t YWR K Π= − −  (10) 
where t R  is the domestic return to capital. Profit maximization yields the standard FOC: 
tt t YR K α=  (11) 
(1 ) tt YW α −=  (12) 
Most of the action in this model comes from what entrepreneurs do. At the end of period t, 
they have some net worth t N , expressed in units of domestic goods, and have access to a 
world capital market where the (safe) interest rate (expressed in units of domestic goods) is 
given by rt. I assume, with no loss of generality, that rt = 0 is constant and exogenous. 
Entrepreneurs invest in capital for period t+1 at the end of period t using their net 
worth  t N  and borrow from capital markets according to the following restriction: 
11 tt t t N RERd K + + +=  (13) 
where “dt+1” is the stock of foreign debt in period t+1. Capital consists of only domestic 
goods. I introduce financial imperfections by assuming that entrepreneurs cannot borrow 
more than a multiple 0<μ <1 of their net worth t N : 
1 tt t RERd N μ + ≤    (14) 
where μ  is a stochastic random variable whose realization becomes common knowledge at 
the end of t=0 (more on this below). Condition (14) may or may not bind. If it binds, the 
country is “financially constrained.” Sudden stops are relevant phenomena insofar as they 




only case relevant here is the case in which (14) binds (for any possible realization of the 
random variable). Combining (13) and (14):
 13 
() 1 1 tt KN μ + =+  (15) 
In every period, entrepreneurs collect their return to capital (αYt), repay inherited 
foreign debt (RERt dt). Therefore, their net worth is: 
0 tt t t N Y RERd α =− ≥  (16) 
Note that  t N  ≥ 0 implies that entrepreneurs are never insolvent. In (16) we see the “balance 
sheet” effect. An increase in RERt (i.e. a real depreciation) reduces the net worth of 
entrepreneurs. With less net worth, they can invest less. To see this, combine (15) and (16): 
1 (1 )( ) tt t t K Y RERd μ α + =+ −  (17) 
This expression shows that investment carried forward is as expected, an increasing 
function of the return to capital, and a decreasing function of the cost of debt-repayment in 
domestic goods.  
4)  Market Clearing 
To derive the market clearing conditions, recall that given that entrepreneurs don’t 
consume until retirement, the consumption of domestic goods is simply a fraction γ of the 
value of total consumption given by (5). Note that we have not ruled out the possibility that 
part of the domestic goods are exported abroad, but assuming that the foreign elasticity of 
substitution across goods in consumption is one, and that the share of domestic goods in 
foreigners’ expenditure is negligible, the home good value of exports is RERtX, where X is 
exogenous.
14 The only other use of home goods is for domestic investment. Putting these 
pieces together and using (7) yields the market clearing condition for home goods: 
1
1 () tt t t t Y K RER C RER X
γ γ
−
+ =+ +               (18) 
                                                 
13 If constraint (14) did not bind (i.e. we did not allow for sudden stops), then investment decisions are driven 
















This equation is a standard arbitrage condition. Investment decisions are carried in period t but they don’t 
yield return until period t+1. The return on investment in simply the return to capital (αYt+1) and the cost of 
borrowing abroad to invest Kt+1 units is simply (RERt+1/ RERt) per unit. 
14 Krugman (1999) and Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2003) make this simplifying assumption too. It allows 




Next, combine (5), (7) and (12) to obtain: 
1 (1 ) ( ) tt t YR E RC
γ α
− −=  (19) 
And combining (18) and (19) yields: 
1 tt t YK R E R X λ + =+  (20) 
where 1( 1) 0 λ γα =− − >. 
Note that equation (20) captures the standard positive aspect of real depreciations, 
which is that, all else being equal, a more depreciated real exchange rate increases the 
home value of exports which results in a boost to domestic output. In the absence of capital 
market imperfections and balance sheet effects, this would be the only aspect of real 
depreciations that matters.  
5)  Equilibrium  
Next I use the fact that this is a 2-period model (i.e., t=0 and t=1) to solve for the 
equilibrium conditions sequentially. At the end of t=0 entrepreneurs make the choices that 
determine investment carried forward. For simplicity, assume Y0 is fixed and exogenous. 
Y1 instead is given by (9). K1 is pinned down by two equations (20) and (17) which are re-
written as follows: 
01 0 YKR E R X λ =+  (21) 
10 0 0 (1 )( ) KY R E R d μ α =+ −  (22) 
where d0 is the debt that entrepreneurs have inherited. Equation (21) is the “aggregate 
demand” equation (AD) and (22) is the “financial constraint” (FC). Together, they define a 
system of equations with two unknowns: RER0 and K1. In Figure 1, I solve the problem 
diagrammatically.
15 
In order to analyze the consequences of sudden stops, we begin by treating them as 
exogenous shocks (i.e. μ  non-random and exogenous). A sudden stop is a tightening of the 
borrowing constraint (i.e. a fall inμ ). This is illustrated in Figure 2 as an inward rotation of 
the FC. 
                                                 
15 I consider only the case in which the slope of the FC is smaller (i.e. steeper) than the slope of AD. The 
opposite case is empirically odd, since it implies that a tightening of the financial constraint leads to an 




Figure 1: Aggregate Demand and Financial Constraint 
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The immediate consequence of the tightening is the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate (i.e. RER0
low μ >RER0) that leads to a decrease investment (i.e. K1
low μ < K1). 
A fall in investment translates into a contraction of real output at t+1=1 (i.e. Y1
low μ < Y1).
16  
Interestingly, the contractionary effects of a tightening of the FC are strengthened by 
closedness. To see this, note that for countries that trade less (i.e. low X) AD is steeper. 
Figure 3 plots the relevant parts of AD and FC for two countries that are identical except 
that one is low X (i.e. closed) while the other is high X (i.e. open). For the sake of the 
argument, assume that exogenous parameters are such that RER0 and K1 are the same in 
both countries. 
Figure 3: Tightening of the FC in Closed and Open Economies 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the country with more closedness suffers greater real 
exchange rate depreciation and more output loss in the aftermath of an identical shock. 
Technically, this means that more closedness accentuates the effects of a tightening of the 
                                                 
16 See analytic appendix for formal proof. On the empirical front, Hutchinson and Noy (2004) find that 
sudden stops have a large negative, but short lived, impact on output growth. They estimate that the 
cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is around 13-15 percent over a three-year period. 
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FC on investment and output.  The formal proof of this result is in the Analytical Appendix 
(Appendix A.4) at the end of the paper. 
In summary, the link between closedness and the fall in output associated with a 
tightening of the FC (i.e. sudden stop) is given by the real exchange rate. Closedness 
increases the size of the real exchange rate depreciation required in the aftermath of a 
tightening and, consequently, economies with more closedness suffer more. Cavallo and 
Frankel (2004) provide empirical evidence of the existence of correlation between (lack of) 
trade openness and output contraction in the aftermath of sudden stops.  
It is clear from the previous analysis that sudden stops are more harmful in less 
open economies. But does this make them more or less likely? To answer this question we 
need to think carefully about what causes them. Thus far, we have treated sudden stops as 
purely exogenous shocks. The next step is to endogenize them.  
6)  Endogenous Sudden Stops 
The timing of events is as follows. At the end of t=0, when entrepreneurs decide 
how much to invest and right before they pay the inherited debt d0, lenders make an “offer” 
about the level ofμ . The offer is random (i.e.μ   is random) because it is driven by 
stochastic shocks to the risk preferences of lenders. For simplicity, assume first thatμ is 
uniformly distributed in the support (0, 1).
17 Uncertainty is realized when borrowers 
receive the offer, and they can accept or reject any offer.
18 Consider a representative 
offerμ : 
•  If the borrowers reject the offer, there will be no additional lending (μ =0). In 
retaliation, the borrowers default on d0 (the inherited debt) to “ease the pain.” We 
call this situation a “sudden stop” (SS). Recall that we are assuming that the 
entrepreneurs are never insolvent, so default is always strategic: borrowers don’t 
pay back the inherited debt because they don’t want to, not because they can’t. 
                                                 
17 This assumption is relaxed later to endogeneize the extent of credit rationing. 
18 The source of uncertainty in the model traces back to stochastic shocks to lenders’ risk preferences that 
determine how much they want to lend. The lending to a particular country is part of the investment portfolio 
decision of lenders. There are reasons outside the model why the financing limit that the lenders are willing to 
extend to a particular country at a point in time is stochastic. For example, periods in time when interest rates 




Defaulting on d0  effectively yields “relief” to the borrowers as it reduces the 
transfers to the lenders (see Appendix A.4 for details).
19  
•  If the borrowers accept the offer, the new lending takes place accordingly and the 
borrowers pay back the inherited debt. In this case there is no sudden stop (NSS). 
Note that the offer might be high or low, but if it is accepted by the borrowers it 
means that there is new lending and thereby NSS. 
In this setting a sudden stop is the situation in which the realization ofμ (i.e. the 
“offer”) leads to a crisis in which there is no lending to the borrowers (i.e.μ  = 0) and 
consequently default on the inherited debt (i.e. d0 = 0).
20 In other words, the crisis is caused 
by the borrowers’ decision to reject the lenders’ offer.  
After uncertainty is realized and the borrowers and lenders make their moves, the 
next period begins. At the end of it entrepreneurs collect the return to capital and pay back 
the debt (if there is any). Note that the net worth at the end of t+1 is given by equation (16) 
where d1=0 if there was a SS at the end of t=0. 
For any realization ofμ , the borrowers reject the offer if the payoff given by 
rejection is bigger than the payoff given by acceptance. Recall that the borrowers (the 
entrepreneurs) care about their consumption at retirement. Therefore, their payoff is the net 
worth attainable in t+1=1.  
•  If they reject the offer, 11 1
RR NN Y α == 
•  If they accept the offer, ( ) 11 1 1 1
AA N N Y RER d α == −   
The borrowers reject the offer if  1
R N  > 1
A N , where R = reject and A = accept.  
Note that, given that  11 ()
RR YK
α = , and that rearranging equation (22) we get that 
10
R KY α = , it follows directly that  1
R N  is determined by the exogenous variable  0 Y  and the 
exogenous parameter α.
21 In particular, note that  1
R N  does not change withμ . Instead  1
A N  
                                                 
19 For analytical simplicity, we assume that there are no sanctions associated to default. The results do not 
change when sanctions are allowed, as long as sanctions are not big enough to prevent default altogether. See 
appendix for details. 
20 See Calvo et. al. (2003) for a discussion about the close association between sudden stops and debt 
defaults. 
21 Note that when rejection takes place μ=0 (because there is no lending), and d0=0 (because there is default 
on the inherited debt), so it follows from equation (22) that K
R




is monotonically increasing inμ .
22 That is, within the subset of offers that are accepted, 
more generous offers yield higher net worth. Figure 4 summarizes the relationship 
between 1
R N ,  1
A N  andμ . 
Figure 4: 1
R N ,  1
A N  andμ  
 
In this figure, 1
A N  is drawn as a straight line for simplicity. What is important for 
our purposes here, is that given that 1
A N  is monotonically increasing in the realization of μ   
and that the y-intercept of  1
A N  is below the y-intercept of  1
R N ,
23 then there is a threshold 
value μ  = μ * below which the borrowers reject any offer and above which they accept it. 
Therefore, given the exogenous variables,μ * is the realization of μ  that satisfies  1
R N  = 
1
A N  (See equation (44) in the Appendix A.4).  
Note that we can formally compute the equilibrium probability of sudden stops for 
every country (conditional on the amount that lenders are willing to offer) as the 
probability that the realization of the random variable μ  falls below μ *. Thus: 
                                                 
22 See appendix for proof. Also, computer simulations of the model are available upon request. 
23 Note that when μ=0 (there is no new lending), the difference between  1
A N  and  1
R N  is that the former 
includes the payment of the inherited debt while the latter does not. Therefore, it must be true that when there 
is no new lending,  1
R N  >  1
















() ( * ) ( ) PS S P f d
μ
μ μμ μ =< = ∫  (23) 
where () PS S is the probability of sudden stops, and () f μ is the p.d.f. of the uniform 
distribution. It follows directly that: 
  () * PS S μ =  (24) 
In Appendix A.4 it is shown thatμ * is a decreasing function of X/d0. The intuition is 
straightforward:μ * is inversely proportional to the creditworthiness of the debtor country 
as lower μ * implies that, conditional on the amount that lenders are willing to offer, there 
is less risk of default. The creditworthiness of countries depends positively on exposure to 
trade (i.e., X), and negatively on the amount of inherited debt (i.e., d0). In other words, 
economies that trade less are more likely to default on the inherited debt and, therefore, to 
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 (25) 
where the signs below each variable indicate the direction of causality. 
  So far, I have assumed that μ  is uniformly distributed in the support (0, 1). This 
has the advantage of keeping the problem tractable, but it has the drawback that that it does 
not allow the extent of credit rationing captured by μ  to respond endogenously to the 
likelihood of sudden stops. One potential criticism to this approach is that there is 
incompleteness in the way the model has been specified because lenders should behave 
optimally too. To deal with this problem, assume that μ  is random but that has a 
distribution whose mean in inversely proportional to * μ . This means that more 
creditworthy countries (i.e., countries with lower * μ ) are exposed, on average, to less 
credit rationing. For concreteness, assume that μ  has a distribution with mean 1- * μ . As 
the maximum feasible level of credit rationing is given by 0 μ = , the distribution of μ  is 
necessarily bounded below by zero. Thus, potential candidates for alternative distributions 




This alternative formulation endogenizes the extent of credit rationing, while 
keeping the randomness of μ  as a way of introducing exogenous shocks to the economy.
24 
What are the implications of this alternative specification for the equilibrium probability of 
sudden stops? 
Let’s begin with the case where μ  is exponentially distributed (the chi-squared 
case is worked out in Appendix A.4). The equilibrium probability of sudden stops for every 
country is given by (23): 
*
0
() ( * ) ( ) PS S P f d
μ













 is the p.d.f. of the of the exponential distribution and 1- * μ  is 
the mean. Thus, solving the integral, it follows that:   
*




− =−                                        (26) 
This implies that the change in the probability of sudden stops for a given change in the 
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which is monotonically increasing for any  * μ . Therefore as  * μ  is, in turn, a decreasing 
function exposure to trade (i.e., X), it follows that the probability of sudden stops is, as 
before, an increasing function of closedness.  
In summary, this way of modeling sudden stops has the advantage that it fits nicely 
with the previous result that a tighter FC leads to more harmful outcomes in economies 
with more closedness. It is precisely because a low realization of μ  might be “too costly to 
bear” in economies with less exposure to trade that the temptation to default on the 
inherited debt (d0) might trigger a sudden stop as an endogenous response to the borrowers 
                                                 
24 Periods when the liquidity conditions in the world are tight are periods when the realized μ  falls below the 
mean, while periods when the world liquidity conditions are more lax are periods when the realizedμ  falls 




optimization problem: they would rather not receive any lending and default on the 
inherited debt, than to accept an offer that is insufficient to get a level of investment that, 
given what they already owe, surpasses what they get if they default. A higher ratio of trade 
is a form of “giving hostages” that makes a cutoff of lending (i.e. sudden stops) less 
likely.
25 In the next section we explore this prediction of the model. 
 
III. Empirical Methodology 
In the next section, I test the proposition that countries with greater closedness are 
more prone to sudden stops in capital flows. To do so, I estimate variants of the following 
equation: 
 
P(SS)i,t = c + φ(Closedness)i,t + б1(Foreign Debt/GDP)i,t-1 + б2(Liability Dollarization)i,t-1 + 
χ(CA/GDP) i,t-1 + ωZ + εi,t                                                                                                                        (28) 
 
where equation (28) is simply an extended version of equation (25), with a linear functional 
form.  
•  “c” is a constant term. 
•  “SS” is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a sudden stop hits country “i” at year 
“t” and 0 otherwise. Consequently, P(SS)i,t is the probability of a sudden stop taking 
place in country “i” during year “t”.  
•  “Closedness” is the negative of the trade to GDP ratio. 
•   “CA/GDP” is the current account balance to GDP.  It is included in the regressions 
because, as stated in the Introduction, the cost of the sudden stop and thus, its 
probability, will naturally be directly linked to the outstanding current account 
balance (i.e. a measure of the required resource transfer abroad in the aftermath of 
the shock). 
•  “Foreign Debt/GDP” and “Liability Dollarization” are discussed in detail below. 
•  “Z” is a set of lagged and contemporaneous regressors included for robustness 
checks. 
                                                 




In order to construct the dummy variable SSi,t, it is important to have a measure of 
sudden cuts in foreign capital inflows (i.e., worsening of the financial account surplus) that 
is not the consequence of a positive shock that works as alternative financing source, 
namely a terms of trade shock. To do so, I follow Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2003) 
closely, and using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics database (IFS) for 
the period 1970-2002, I compute sudden stop episodes as a reduction in the Current 
Account (CA) deficit during the same year of a reduction in Financial Account (FA) 
surplus. To guarantee that this reduction in the CA deficit is not the result of a boom—
rising exports, imports and income—the episode has to be accompanied by a simultaneous 
reduction in real output. In other words, a sudden stop occurs during the year in which 
there is a noticeable reduction in the current account deficit that is triggered by a disruptive 
(i.e. recessionary) reduction in foreign capital inflows.
26 Based on alternative definitions of 
what is “noticeable” and “disruptive” I compute four different classifications of sudden 
stops. Figure 5 summarizes the overall (global) pattern of sudden stops for my preferred 
classification: SS1.  
































































































































































                                                 




The total number of episodes in SS1 is 86 which is 2.39 percent of total available 
country/year observations in the dataset.
27 As Figure 5 shows, these events take place 
around well-known crises prone epochs: the early 1980’s debt crises in Latin America; the 
1997-1998 Asian crises; and the new wave of crises in developing countries in the late 
1990’s and early 2000. As for the regional split, 16% of all sudden stops occurred in the 
Asia-Pacific region; 13% in Europe; 33% in Latin America; 15% in the Middle East; 21% 
in Africa; and 1% in South Asia
28 and North America respectively. Alternative definitions 
show similar patterns of temporal/spatial distribution.
29 
As for the regressors: 
•  “Closedness” is typically measured in empirical work using (the negative of) a 
country’s ratio of total exports plus total imports to GDP—the so-called “trade to 
GDP ratio” (X + M / Y). All the necessary data is readily available from the IFS for 
almost all the countries in the world. But, as argued in the Introduction, the problem 
with using this measure of closedness is that it might be correlated with other 
unobserved country characteristics creating identification problems and potentially 
biased estimators. To try to avoid these, I instrument closedness by the negative of 
the “predicted” trade to GDP ratio based on gravity equations. In its most basic 
form, the gravity equation captures the intuitive notion that bilateral trade flows are 
proportional to the product of each country GDP level, and inversely related to the 
distance between them. Therefore, using data on country’s geographic 
characteristics, bilateral trade flows, and GDP, I compute the “predicted” trade to 
GDP ratio. Research on gravity has extended in recent years, and there are some 
very complete databases that can be used for these computations. In particular, I use 
the dataset available at Andrew Rose’s webpage,
30 which has been widely used for 
empirical research.
31 Details on the methodology used are left to the appendix. The 
                                                 
27 The complete list of crises episodes per country is in Table A.1. in Appendix A.1. 
28 The South Asian region countries are: India, Sri-Lanka, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan, 
29 Graphs are available upon request. 
30 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm 
31 The data set consists of 41,678 bilateral trade observations spanning six different years (1970, 1975, 1980, 
1985, 1990, and 1995). All 186 countries, dependencies, territories, overseas departments, colonies, and so 
forth for which the United Nations Statistical Office collects international trade data are included in the data 




critical element is that, to the extent that the “predicted” trade to GDP ratio is highly 
positively correlated to the actual trade to GDP ratio, then it is a good instrument, 
because it is unlikely that geography is related to economic outcomes through any 
channel other than trade (i.e. geography is quite plausibly exogenous).
32 A 
limitation imposed by this methodology is that it does not allow for enough 
variation in the instrument so as to estimate a model with country fixed effects 
(more on this below). I don’t consider this to be a serious problem, because most of 
the variation in closedness is across countries, not over time.  
•  “d0/Y0” in equation (25) is split into “Foreign Debt/GDP” and “Liability 
Dollarization” in (28). In the model of the previous section “d0/Y0” played a dual 
role: a proxy for vulnerability to “balance sheet” effects (i.e. “Liability 
Dollarization”) and a proxy for “foreign indebtness” (i.e. “Foreign Debt/GDP”). 
The reason is the assumption that all external debt is denominated in foreign 
currency. That is not necessarily true empirically,
33 so in the actual implementation 
of (25) I seek to capture the vulnerability to “balance sheet” effects independently 
from the level of indebtness by including a separate proxy for currency mismatches 
in the balance sheets. Data for “Foreign Debt/GDP” comes from IFS, where foreign 
debt is line 89a in that database. 
•  I use two alternative measures of “liability dollarization.” First the ratio of foreign 
liabilities of the financial sector to money (IFS line 26C/Line 34). Although this is 
not a direct measure of the extent to which a country’s balance sheet present a 
mismatch in the currency denomination of assets and liabilities this variable has 
been used in the literature as a close proxy,
34 primarily because it is available for 
almost all countries since 1970, and because it should be correlated to actual 
balance sheet mismatches. Second, the alternative proxy is a measure of deposit 
dollarization from Arteta (2002 and 2003). This is “Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits” 
in the financial system. Intuitively, countries with a high percentage of deposit 
                                                                                                                                                    
presented in Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997), augmented with data from U.N.’s International Trade 
Statistics Yearbook. This data set is estimated to cover at least 98% of all trade. 
32 The actual correlation between the variable closedness and the instrument used in this paper is 0.52. 
33 In particular, the measure of foreign debt that I use IFS line 89a is based on residence of the lender, not on 
currency denomination of debt. 




dollarization, but whose domestic currency is not the U.S. dollar, are (most likely) 
countries whose public and private sectors tend to borrow heavily in foreign 
currencies. In Arteta’s database, data on the aggregate volume of foreign-currency-
denominated (“dollar”) deposits of residents are available for 92 developing and 
transition economies. The time span varies across countries, with some having data 
from as early as 1975 and some having data only from about 1995 onwards.  
Finally, “Z” is a set of (lagged and contemporaneous) regressors included for 
robustness check purposes and to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. These are:  
•  “Reserves in months of imports” (because reserves could potentially be used as 
self-insurance against sudden stops), 
•   “Log of GDP per capita” (to control for the stage of economic development),  
•  “FDI / GDP” (the stability of FDI flows could reduce the likelihood of sudden 
stops),  
•  “Institutional Quality” (to control for the possibility that closedness, even after 
instrumenting it, is not incorrectly appropriating effects on sudden stops that really 
go through institutions),  
•  “Short-term debt / Total debt” (to control for the effect of the term structure of the 
debt in the likelihood of a crisis), and  
•  “Index of Exchange Rate Rigidity,” a measure for nominal exchange rate rigidity (it 
is included to test whether exchange rate policy affects the probability of sudden 
stops).  
All these variables come from WDI CD-ROM with the exception of the “institutional 
quality” data that comes from Kaufmann et. al. (2002) and Marshall and Jaggers (2002)’s 
Polity IV Project, and the data on “Index of Exchange Rate Rigidity,” that comes from 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
In order to compute the probability of sudden stops, I use instrumental variables 
Probit and linear regression techniques.
35 Non-instrumental variables results are also 
reported. I do not report panel data (country) fixed-effects results because, as already 
                                                 
35 One limitation of linear models vis-à-vis non-linear models is that the probability of a sudden stop is not 





discussed, most important source of variation is across countries, not within. The main 
drawback of this methodology is that the results may therefore carry an omitted variable 
bias because I am not controlling for country specific effects. To minimize this problem, I 
include in the regressions controls for various other possible determinants of sudden stops. 
Nevertheless, even at the risk of some persistent omitted variable bias, the methodology 
used here is at least properly controlling for endogeneity so that reverse causality cannot be 
blamed for the positive effects of closedness on sudden stops. Finally, single cross-section 
results are also reported. 
Summary statistics for all the variables and a complete list of data sources are found 
in the Appendix A.3. 
 
IV. Results 
I now proceed with the instrumental variables estimation of equation (28) using a 
stacked cross-section and computing standard errors that are robust to clustered 
heteroskedasticity. All independent variables—other than “closedness” and “effectiveness 
of government”— are lagged one period to ameliorate endogeneity (introducing 
contemporaneous rather than lagged variables does not affect the results). Nevertheless, the 
methodology employed here only promises the exogeneity of closedness, so no causal 
relationship will be inferred from the other point estimates.
36 I do not exclude contiguous 
crises episodes, but all the results are robust to the inclusion of a one-year, two sided 
omission window around crises episodes. Results include regional dummies, but these 
coefficients are not reported.
37 As a measure of institutional quality I report the coefficient 
on “effectiveness of government” which is one of the six proxies of institutional quality in 
Kaufman et. al. (2002). All the results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the 
inclusion of any of the other five proxies proposed in that paper.
38 Given that the 
institutional quality data in Kaufman et. al. (2002) has limited time series variation, every 
country in the sample is assigned the average value (time-invariant). As additional 
                                                 
36 The main purpose of the additional controls is to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias. In particular, I 
treat the control variables as exogenous, even when some of them could perhaps be considered endogenous.  
37 Further details on the results and robustness checks are available upon request.  
38 These are: “Voice and Accountability”, “Control of Corruption”, “Rule of Law”, “Political Stability/Lack 




robustness check, I also use Marshall and Jaggers (2002)’s Polity IV Project data, which is 
panel (country/year), but provides a measure of the political regime’s characteristics: either 
democracy (high values) or autocracy (low values), rather that institutional quality per se.
39 
Using this measure does not change the outcomes.  
The results reported are based on my preferred definition of sudden stops (SS1), but 
all estimates are robust to the use of the alternative definitions.
40 Not surprisingly, the 
explanatory power of these regressions is not high. This is consistent with the performance 
of standard models of crises and the usual inability of leading-indicator exercises to 
properly predict events.
41 Table 1 summarizes the results for some variants of (28) using 
instrumental variables (IV) Probit specification.
42 The results from linear regression models 
(available in Table A.5.0 in Appendix A.5) are qualitatively very similar, although the 
coefficients are not directly comparable. The first column (shaded) is the main 
specification, the rest of the columns are different variants of (28) with controls. 
“Closedness” is positive and statistically significant across all the variants.  
Table 1.b reports the implied marginal effects for closedness estimated from the IV 
probit regressions at the mean of the independent variables (first row). It also reports the 
predicted change in the probability of a sudden stop for a 10 percentage point increase in 
closedness (which in the real world would be going from Australia’s situation to 
Argentina’s) by combining the marginal effects with the estimated probability of sudden 
stops (i.e., the probability of a positive outcome —second row—).
43 The results range 
between 40% and 56%, with the benchmark case being 42%. That is, a country that trades 
10% less of GDP (i.e., Argentina vis-à-vis Australia) is, ceteris paribus, 42% more likely to 
be hit by a sudden stop. The estimated marginal effects from the linear regressions (see 
                                                 
39 In particular, I use: POLITY2 (numeric). Range = -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy). 
Combined Polity Score: Computed by subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC; normal range polity scores are 
imputed for coded “interregnum" and "transition period" special polity conditions, polities coded 
“interruption" on the POLITY variable are left blank. 
40 I use three alternative definitions. The details are in the data appendix. 
41 See, for example, Arteta (2003) 
42 The method of estimation is maximum likelihood, and standard errors are corrected to account for clustered 
heteroskedasticity.  The results are robust when a two-sep estimator is implemented using the method of 
Whitney Newey, “Efficient Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Endogenous Explanatory 
Variables”, Journal of Econometrics (1987).  
43 A 10 percentage point increase in the independent variable “closedness” is, for example, an increase from 





Table A.5.0 in Appendix A.5) are smaller but less reliable.
44 The average change in the 
probability of an event occurring as the result of a unit change in the value of closedness is 
approximately 0.077. This means that an increase of 10 percentage points in closedness 
increases the likelihood of a sudden stop by approximately 32%.
45  
Table 1: Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions 
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-1.13   
(0.61) 
Obs.  1040  706 260 560 748 915  1458  1177  1377 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1%  
** Statistically Significant at 5%  
 * Statistically Significant at 10% 
 
 
                                                 
44 Note that in a linear regression model the slope coefficient of a regressor measures the effect on the average 
value of the regressand for a unit change in the value of the regressor. Although linear regression applied to a 
binary dependent variable has a simple interpretation, it has problems, not least of which is that it is possible 
to have nonsensical predicted values. 
45 Given the estimated coefficient on closedness, a 0.10 increase in the independent variable increases the left 
hand side by: 0.10*0.077= 0.0077. The left hand-side variable is either “0’s” or “1’s”. Because 2.39% of the 
observations in the sample are 1’s,  a 0.0077 increase in the left hand side variable means that there is an 





Table 1.b: Marginal effects (for closedness) after ivprobit 
  Marginal effects (dy/dx) are for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Closedness t    0.14 0.34 0.17 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.11 0.16 0.16 
Probability of a 
positive outcome   
0.033  0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04  0.042 
Δ(PSS)   42% 55% 56% 50% 55% 50% 36% 40% 38% 
Δ(PSS)  = the change in the probability of a sudden stop given by a 10 percentage point  increase in closedness (i.e., an increase of  0.10 
in the independent variable). It is computed by multiplying the marginal effect (first row) by 0.10 and diving by the probability of a 
positive outcome (second row).  Marginal effects estimated at the mean of the independent variables.  
 
Interestingly,  б1  –the coefficient on “Foreign Debt/GDP”—is positive but 
statistically significant across only few of the variants in Table 1.
46,  47 This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that different countries are able to tolerate different levels of 
debt.
48 A critic might argue that the ratio of foreign debt to GDP might also be endogenous 
and thus its inclusion in the regressions could lead to biased estimates. Even though all 
regressors are lagged, there might still be some persistent endogeneity. In the absence of 
good instruments for the ratio of foreign debt to GDP an alternative test is to exclude it. 
The results reported in columns (7), (8) and (9) of Table 1 indicate that the estimates of the 
effect of closedness do not change when debt measures are excluded.  
б2 –the coefficient that seeks to capture the “balance sheet” effects—is positive but 
not always statistically significant when definition (1) is used (although it is significant in 
the main specification), and negative but insignificant when Arteta’s dollarization 
definition is used instead.
49 This result suggests that these measures of dollarization appear 
not to have significant detrimental effects in terms of increased vulnerability to sudden 
stops. A closer inspection of Table 1 reveals that the only instances when б2 appears as 
statistically significant are when “short term debt / total debt” is excluded from the 
regressions. The results reported in columns (5) and (9) of Table 1 indicate that the 
estimated effects of closedness are robust to the exclusion of any of the proxies for 
dollarization.  
                                                 
46 Similarly, Calvo et. al. (2003) don’t find a significant effect of total public debt on the probability of 
sudden stops in their probit regressions, nor do Frankel and Rose (1996) in their probit regressions of 
currency crises. 
47 Using “Foreign Debt/Exports” as a solution to concerns about how foreign debt and GDP are measured in 
domestic currency fails to change any results. 
48 See Calvo et. al. (2003) for a more in-depth discussion.  
49 Note that when Arteta’s definition is used, a lot of data points are lost. Interestingly, the coefficient on 




Finally, χ –the coefficient that controls for the size of the transfer in the aftermath of 
a sudden stop—is negative and statistically significant across all variants, meaning that, as 
conjectured in the Introduction, larger resource transfer in its aftermath (i.e. low initial 
CA/Y) makes sudden stops more likely. Column (9) shows that the estimated effect of 
closedness is also robust the exclusion of this variable from the regressions.  
As for the controls: the coefficient on short term debt to total debt appears as 
positive, but statistically insignificant. This means that the term structure of the debt does 
not to have a significant effect on the probability of sudden stops. The exclusion of this 
variable does not affect the results on closedness. The coefficient on the index of rigidity of 
the nominal exchange rate is positive (indicating a positive relationship between the 
rigidity of the nominal exchange rate and sudden stops) but statistically insignificant. The 
rest of the controls (including institutional quality proxies) rarely appear to be statistically 
significant and all the results on closedness are robust to the inclusion of these variables in 
the regressions. Regional dummies (not reported) are typically insignificant. Recall that 
controls are included to minimize the omitted variable bias. But if some of these controls 
are also endogenous then the estimated effect of closedness could still be biased. To verify 
that the results are not driven by the inclusion of any of these controls, column (9) in Table 
1 reports the regression results without controls. It is shown that the result on closedness is 
robust to the exclusion of all the control variables. 
The results for ordinary probit regressions are reported in Table 2.
50 These results 
must be taken with caution due to the endogeneity problems already mentioned. The sign 
of the point estimate of closedness is positive across all variants, but noticeably smaller 
than the ones obtained in the instrumental variables estimations. Table 2.b. reports the 
implied changes in the probability of a sudden stop for a 10 percentage point increase in 
closedness. They range between 1/2 and 1/3 of their counterparts in Table 1.b. This means 
that correcting for the potential sources of endogeneity, the effect of closedness on the 
probability of sudden stops is even stronger than what one would be lead to conclude from 
the OLS regressions.
51 One possible interpretation is that the OLS results may 
underestimate the true relationship between exposure to trade and sudden stops because in 
                                                 
50 Table A.5.2 in Appendix A.5 reports the results from Pooled OLS regressions. 




the immediate aftermath of a crisis there might be a boom in exports due to ensuing real 
exchange depreciation. Another possible interpretation is that, in line with Aizenman 
(2003), more financial openness (which is a pre-requisite for sudden stops) leads to more 
trade by reducing the cost of access to trade credit. Irrespective of the possible channels, 
what is clear from these results is that the direction of the bias in the OLS regressions is 
towards reducing the effect of lack of exposure to trade on the likelihood of sudden stops. 
The rest of the point estimates are qualitatively similar to those found in Table 1, except for 
“Foreign Debt/GDP” which is now negative, but statistically insignificant.   
 
Table 2: Ordinary Probit Regressions 
(Reporting marginal effects) 
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Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  778 464 118 352 477 597  1120  904 
Pseudo R
2  0.1  0.12 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 
Marginal effects estimated at the mean of the independent variables.  
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1%  
** Statistically Significant at 5%  







Table 2.b: Implied changes in the probability of sudden stops  
  
Probability of a 
positive outcome 
0.028 0.036 0.061  0.03  0.037 0.029 0.026 0.031 
Δ(PSS)  12.5%  19% 40% 17% 19% 16% 10% 11% 
Δ(PSS)  = the change in the probability of a sudden stop given by a 10 percentage point  increase in closedness (i.e., an increase of  
0.10 in the independent variable). It is computed by multiplying the marginal effect (first row in Table 2) by 0.10 and diving by the 
probability of a positive outcome (first row in Table 2.b). 
 
As a first robustness check, I test if the results are sensitive to the definition of 
sudden stops. To do so, I re-run all regressions using the alternative definitions listed in 
Appendix A.1. Table A.5.1 in Appendix A.5 reports the results of the IV probit regressions 
for the main specification using the alternative definitions. As shown in the table, the 
results are robust to different definitions of sudden stops.  
As an additional robustness check, I run all regressions on a single cross-section of 
countries. To do so, I construct two new dependant variables that seek to measure 
countries’ proclivity to sudden stops: (1) the number of sudden stops that each country 
experienced between 1970 and 2002; and (2) a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
country experienced at least one sudden stop between 1970 and 2002, and zero otherwise.
52 
Given the nature of these new variables, I apply a tobit model to (1) and a probit model to 
(2). The regressors are the 1970-2002 average of each of the variables used in the panel 
regressions. The results for some specifications are reported in Tables 3 and 4. For 
comparability purposes I focus only on the probit regressions here. The tobit results (which 
are reassuringly similar) are reported in Tables A.5.3 and A.5.4 in Appendix A.5. 
The evidence is consistent with that of the panel estimates. Closedness is 
systematically associated with more proclivity to sudden stops in ordinary and instrumental 
variables regressions. The other regressors have the standard signs. The only noticeable 
differences with the panel regressions are that: (i) the current account balance loses 
statistical significance in the cross-section regressions. The most likely reason is that for 
most countries, it averages out to zero over extended periods of time; and (ii) liability 
dollarization appears to be more statistically significant in all the regressions. This is 
probably due to the fact that over longer horizons, the dollarization proxies do a better job 
in capturing balance sheet mismatches. As for the predicted changes in the probability of 
                                                 
52 In order to achieve more variation in the dependant variable, I use “SS3” which is the most stringent of my 




sudden stops for a 10 percentage point increase in closedness, they average 29% in the 
ordinary regressions, and 32% for the IV regressions. Even though there is a smaller spread 
between ordinary and IV estimates than in the previous regressions, the IV estimates still 
systematically predict higher increases in the probability of sudden stops for a given 
increase in closedness.   
Table 3: IV Probit Regressions (cross-section) 
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per capita           0.0003 
(0.0003) 
Effectiveness of 





Dummies?  YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 












Obs. 104  74  74  62  53  53 
Dependant variable takes value 1 if the country had at least one sudden stop between 1970 & 2002, and 0 otherwise. 
All independent variables are year averages for the period 1970-2002. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1%  
** Statistically Significant at 5%  
* Statistically Significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 3.b: Marginal effects (for closedness) after ivprobit 
  Marginal effects (dy/dx) are for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
Closedness    0.97 1.07 1.13 1.04 1.32 1.44 
Probability of a 
positive outcome    0.33 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.42 0.44 
Δ(PSS)    29% 33% 35% 32% 31% 33% 
Δ(PSS)  = the change in the probability of a sudden stop given by a 10 percentage point  increase in closedness (i.e., an increase of  0.10 in 
the independent variable). It is computed by multiplying the marginal effect (first row) by 0.10 and diving by the probability of a positive 











Table 4: Ordinary Probit Regressions (cross-section) 
(Reporting marginal effects) 
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per capita         0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Effectiveness of 





Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs.  114  81 81 67 56 56 
Pseudo  R2  0.15 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.32 
Marginal effects estimated at the mean of the independent variables.  
Dependant variable takes value 1 if the country had at least one sudden stop between 1970 & 2002, and 0 otherwise. 
All independent variables are year averages for the period 1970-2002. 
Robust Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1%  
 ** Statistically Significant at 5%  
 * Statistically Significant at 10% 
 
Table 4.b: Implied changes in the probability of sudden stops  
   
Probability of a 
positive outcome 
0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.37 0.38 
Δ(PSS)  21% 25% 25% 32% 29% 33% 
Δ(PSS)  = the change in the probability of a sudden stop given by a 10 percentage point  increase in closedness (i.e., an increase of  0.10 in 
the independent variable). It is computed by multiplying the marginal effect (first row in Table 4) by 0.10 and diving by the probability of a 
positive outcome (first row in Table 4.b). 
 
As a final robustness check I stack the data into decades (instead of years) and run 
seemingly unrelated regressions to account for the possibility that the equation errors are 
correlated. The dependant variables are the number of sudden stops in the decade and the 
regressors are the decade averages of each independent variable. As in previous 
regressions, all control variables (other than closedness) are lagged one period (in this case 
a decade) to ameliorate potential endogoneity.
53 The results and implied marginal effects 
are reported in Table A.5.5 in Appendix A.5. The coefficients on closedness are once again 
positive and statistically significant at standard confidence levels for both decades. The 
estimated change in the probability of a sudden stop given by a 10 percentage point 
                                                 
53 This is the reason why the number of sudden stops in 1970 is not treated as an additional linear equation in 




increase in closedness fluctuates between 12% and 18%, and the results are similar in both 
decades. Given that these are non-instrumental variables regressions, they are comparable 
to those in Tables 2 and 2.b. In those tables the corresponding estimated change in the 
probability of a sudden stop varies between 12.5% and 19%.
54 Thus, potentially correlated 
error terms don’t seem to affect the results. 
In summary, the evidence appears to be quite robust. As predicted by the theory, 
economies that trade less are more prone to sudden stops. Controlling for other possible 
determinants of these shocks and instrumenting closedness by gravity estimates to avoid 
identification problems, I find empirical evidence on the existence of a causal link between 
closedness and the instability of financial flows. In fact—for a given set of controls— only 
closedness and (in the panel regressions) the size of current account deficit before the 
shock, appear as significant predictors of these events. The effect of closedness on the 
probability of sudden stops does not only appear to be qualitatively robust, but it is also 
quantitatively significant. A conservative estimate (based on the IV regressions) yields the 
surprising result that, all else equal, increasing closedness by 10 percentage points (i.e. 
going from Australia’s current trade share to Argentina’s average trade share) increases the 
probability of a sudden stop between 30% and 40%. Cavallo and Frankel (2004) find that 




Sudden stops in capital flows can be costly and painful in financially constrained 
economies. Determining what causes them has become a priority in the research agenda. 
This paper presents a framework that endogenizes sudden stops and yields one important 
testable implication: countries that trade less with the rest of world are, ceteris paribus, 
more prone to these events. The empirical evidence reported here, which corrects for the 
endogeneity of trade, supports this prediction. 
The policy implications of this result are important because stable capital flows can 
be instrumental for long-run growth. Recent episodes of balance of payment crises in 
                                                 
54 Excluding the case when Arteta’s measure of dollarization is used in which case the estimated effect of 
closedness in much bigger.  There is no sufficient time-series variation in Arteta’s data to run the seemingly 




developing countries have aroused the debate on the appropriateness of capital account 
openness. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, no part of that debate argues that 
capital flows are per se bad. The question they pose is under what circumstances will 
capital inflows spur growth and not simply sow the seeds for future troubles. One critical 
element is the stability of these flows. If capital inflows are not prone to sudden reversals, 
then it is more likely that they will be functional to economic development. The central 
point of this paper is that a way to be safer is to trade more goods and services with the rest 
of the world.  
This result is counterintuitive to many because one view prevailing in the 
discussions is that more trade means more exposure to the external shocks, and so 
closedness presumably provides a shield against these shocks. Instead, this paper presents a 
framework that shows that more trade reduces the adverse amplifying effects of external 
shocks, and thereby reduces the vulnerability to crises.  
The quantity of commercial trade has an exogenous component (i.e. geography, 
distance to markets), but also an endogenous one (i.e. trade policy). Trade policy, in turn, 
has a locally manageable component: home country tariffs, and an exogenous element from 
the point of view of any individual country: other countries trade and immigration policies. 
If emerging market economies want to take advantage of open capital markets, but 
decrease the risks of sudden stops, they should pursue trade policies that promote trade. If 
developed countries want to help, they should eliminate pending barriers and liberalize 
their trade policies too. Without large quantities of trade, capital account openness that 
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A.1 Sudden Stops 
 
I use four alternative definitions of sudden stops: my preferred definition “SS1”, and three 
alternative “SS2”, “SS3” and “SS4”. “SS2” and “SS3” are conceptually equivalent to 
“SS1”, but are more restrictive in that they capture fewer episodes. “SS4” is, instead, 
equivalent to “SS1” but is less restrictive in that classifies as sudden stops events that don’t 
necessarily trigger recessions. 
 
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 1” (SS1): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70´s, 80´s, 90’s+) 
in the sample and then compute the mean standard deviation by averaging the 
results obtained for each decade. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1”, FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the mean standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations that don’t pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP 
per capita in that country during the same year or the year immediately after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit in that country during the same year or the year immediately after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified 
as either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that 
country, or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
9)  Results:  
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 




Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 2” (SS2): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70´s, 80´s, 90’s+) 
in the sample. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the corresponding decade standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations 
that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP 
per capita in that country during the same year or the year immediately after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit in that country during the same year or the year immediately after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified 
as either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that 
country, or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
9)  Results:  
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 




Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 3” (SS3): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
3)  Compute the standard deviation the year to year changes for each decade (70´s, 
80´s, 90’s+) in the sample and then compute the mean standard deviation for by 
averaging the results obtained for each decade 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the mean standard deviation computed in step (3). Observations that don’t pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP 
per capita in that country during the same year or the year immediately after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit in that country during the same year or the year immediately after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified 
as either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that 
country, or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
9)  Results:  
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 




Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 4” (SS4): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries 
in the period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70´s, 80´s, 90’s+) 
in the sample and then compute the mean standard deviation for by averaging the 
results obtained for each decade. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in 
the sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial 
account between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only 
observations that show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass 
this filter, because they show either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-
year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those 
that represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from 
the mean standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations that don’t pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account 
deficit in that country during the same year or the year immediately after. 
Observations that don’t pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from 
steps (4), (5) and (6). 
7)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent 
episodes (country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified 
as either “0” which means no episodes were registered during that year in that 
country, or “n.a” which means that some data is missing.  
8)  Results:  




“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 




Table A.1: Sudden Stop 1 
Country Episodes             Country Episodes          Country Episodes          
Afghanistan, I.S. of  0             Comoros   1  1988       India   0          
Albania   0             Congo, Republic of  2  1984  1996   Indonesia   1  1997      
Algeria   1  1990          Costa Rica   2  1981  1996   Iran, I.R. of  0          
Angola   0             Côte d'Ivoire   0          Iraq   0          
Antigua and Barbuda   0             Croatia   0          Ireland   0          
Argentina   1  2001          Cyprus   0          Israel   2  1988 1998   
Aruba   0             Czech Republic   0          Italy   0          
Australia   0             Czechoslovakia   0          Jamaica   0          
Austria   0             Denmark   0          Japan   0          
Bahamas, The  0             Djibouti   0          Jordan   2  1992 1993   
Bahrain, Kingdom of  0             Dominica   1  2001       Kenya   0          
Bangladesh   0             Dominican Republic   0          Kiribati   0          
Barbados   1  1982          Ecuador   2  1983  1999   Korea   1  1997      
Belgium   0             Egypt   1  1990       Kuwait   0          
Belgium-Luxembourg  0             El Salvador   1  1979       Kyrgyz Republic   0          
Belize   0             Equatorial Guinea   0          Lao People's Dem.Rep  0          
Benin   1  1983          Ethiopia   2  1982  1991   Lesotho   0          
Bolivia   1  1982          Fiji   1  1999       Liberia   0          
Bosnia & Herzegovina  0             Finland   1  1991       Libya   0          
Botswana   0             France   0          Macedonia, FYR  0          
Brazil   0             Gabon   0          Madagascar   0          
Bulgaria   0             Gambia, The  1  1982       Malawi   1  1981      
Burkina Faso   1  1989          Germany   1  2001       Malaysia   1  1997      
Burundi   0             Ghana   0          Maldives   0          
Cambodia   0             Greece   0          Mali   0          
Cameroon   2  1988  1990      Grenada   0          Malta   1  2000      
Canada   1  1982          Guatemala   0          Mauritania   0          
Cape Verde   1  1990          Guinea   0          Mauritius   0          
Central African Rep.  1  1988          Guinea-Bissau   1  1986       Mexico   3  1982 1994 1995 
Chad   0             Guyana   0          Mongolia   2  1990 1991   
Chile   3  1982  1983 1998   Haiti   0          Montserrat   0          
China,P.R.: Mainland  0             Honduras   0          Morocco   1  1995      
China,P.R.:Hong Kong  0             Hungary   0          Mozambique   0          





Country Episodes          Country Episodes             
Namibia   0          St. Kitts and Nevis  0             
Nepal   0          St. Lucia  1  2001         
Netherlands   1  1981       St. Vincent & Grens.  1  2000         
Netherlands Antilles   0          Sudan  0             
New Zealand   2  1988  1998   Suriname  1  1992         
Nicaragua   1  1986       Swaziland  1  1999         
Niger   0          Sweden  1  1991         
Nigeria   1  1999       Switzerland  0             
Norway   0          Syrian Arab Republic  1  1989         
Oman   2  1987  1999   Tanzania  0             
Pakistan   0          Thailand  1  1997         
Panama   1  2000       Togo  0             
Papua New Guinea   0          Tonga  1  1989         
Paraguay   1  2002       Trinidad and Tobago  1  1984         
Peru   1  1998       Tunisia  0             
Philippines   2  1997  1998   Turkey 4  1991 1994  1998  2001
Poland   0          Uganda   0             
Portugal   1  1992       United Kingdom   0             
Romania   0          United States   0             
Rwanda   1  1994       Uruguay   1  2002         
Samoa   0          Vanuatu   1  1991         
São Tomé & Príncipe  0          Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1  1994         
Saudi Arabia  0          Vietnam   0             
Senegal  0          Yemen, Republic of  1  1994         
Seychelles 1  2000        Zambia   1  1990         
Sierra Leone  0          Zimbabwe   1  1983         
Singapore  0                  
Slovak Republic  0                  
Slovenia  0                  
Solomon Islands  1  1998               
Somalia  0                  
South Africa  0                  
Spain 1  1992                




A.2. Gravity Estimates 
 
To compute the gravity estimates I use Frankel and Rose (2002) dataset. It consists 
of 41,678 bilateral trade observations spanning six different years (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 
1990, and 1995). All 186 countries, dependencies, territories, overseas departments, 
colonies, and so forth for which the United Nations Statistical Office collects international 
trade data are included in the data set. The trade data are taken from the World Trade 
Database, a consistent recompilation of the U.N. trade data presented in Feenstra, Lipsey, 
and Bowen (1997), augmented with data from U.N.’s International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook. This data set is estimated to cover at least 98% of all trade. 
For each of the six different years for which I have data I compute OLS regressions 
of the following form: 
 
Log (Ti,j  / Yi) = c + α logdisti,j + βlogpopj + γcomlangi,j + δborderi,j + θareapi,j + 
ρlandlock + μ 
 
Where “Ti,j” is the bilateral trade value between countries “i” and “j”; “Yi” is the real GDP 
of country “i”; “c” is a constant term; “logdisti,j” is the log of the distance between the 
economic centers of countries “i” and “j”; “comlang” is a dummy variable that takes value 
one if “i” and “j” share a common language and is zero otherwise; “border”  is a dummy 
variable that takes value one if “i” and “j” share a border and is zero otherwise; “areapi,j” is 
the log of the product of the areas (in km
2) of countries “i” and “j”; and “landlock” takes 
values two if “i” and “j” are both landlocked,  one if either “i” or “j” are landlocked, and 
zero otherwise; and “μ” is the error term.  
The gravity estimates are generated by taking the exponent of fitted values and 
summing across bilateral partners j. This yields estimates for six different years: 1970, 
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. The missing values of the panel are generated by taking 
the observation corresponding to the closest year with data. The correlation between trade 




A.3. Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
    
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
SS1 3596  .0239155  .1528071  0  1 
SS1bis (no contiguous crises)  3590  .0222841  .1476266  0  1 
SS2 3599  .0188941  .1361701  0  1 
SS2bis (no contiguous crises)  3596  .0180756  .1332436  0  1 
SS3 3599  .013337  .1147293  0  1 
SS3bis (no contiguous crises)   3597  .0127884  .1123762  0  1 
SS4 3595  .0403338  .1967683  0  1 
SS4bis (no contiguous crises)  3587  .0381935  .1916898  0  1 
Closedness  (A)  4247  -.7322445  .432648  -2.960163  -.0153068 
Fitted closedness  (B)  4261  -.1487951  .1497813  -1.364657  -.0016543 
Liability 
Dollarization  (1)  (C)  3454 .3207969 .3902904  0  1.999936 
Liability  
Dollarization (2)  (D)  897 .2666019 .2752479  0  1 
CA / GDP (F)  3630  -.038277  .1034782  -2.404958  .58553 
Foreign Debt / GDP (G)  1791       .2779454      .4373619        0  5.844839 
Index of Exchange Rate 
Rigidity  (H)  3059 2.411246 .8072297  1  3 
Voice and  
Accountability  (I)  3255  .3525906  .9023457 -1.623367 1.693636 
Political Stability/Lack of 
Violence (I)  3038 .2303492 .8255066  -1.694225  1.69047 
Effectiveness of Government     
(I)  3038  .3136892  .8409723 -1.320767 2.082198 
Regulatory  Framework  (I)  3224  .3598345  .5851707 -1.500832 1.244778 
Rule of Law (I)  3224  .2939932  .871838  -1.203638  1.995832 
Control of Corruption (I)  3038  .2972141  .9230486  -1.104606  2.129017 
FDI / GDP (J)  3963       1.902769      4.577513  -82.81054     145.2095 
Reserves in Month of Imports    
(K)  3795  3.420814  2.958747  -.0919    32.14791 
GDP per capita  (L)  2799  6840.761  9583.074  84.72  52675.27 
Short Term Debt / Total 
External Debt  (M)  3430       12.39872    12.85917      0  99.90642 
Polity 2  (O)  4102       .4193077      7.567316        -10     10 
(A) The negative of the trade to GDP ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(B) See Appendix A.2 for an explanation of the methodology employed and data used. 
(C) The ratio of foreign liabilities of the financial sector to money. Source: IFS (Line 26C/line 34) 
(D) The ratio of “Total Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits. Source: Arteta (2002) and Arteta (2003)  
(F) Ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(G) Source: IFS line 89c 
(H) index=1 is (de-facto) flexible exchange rate; index=2 is (de-facto) intermediate arrangement; and index=3 
is (de-facto) peg. Source: Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
(I) Source: Kaufman et. al. (2002) 
(J) Source: WDI-CR ROM 
(K) Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(L) Source: WDI-CD ROM 
(M) Ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD Rom 
(O) Range = -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy). Combined Polity Score: Computed by 
subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC; normal range polity scores are imputed for coded “interregnum" and 
"transition period" special polity conditions, polities coded “interruption" on the POLITY variable are left 




A.4 Analytical Appendix 
 
(A)  Proof that closedness (low X) increases the output cost associated to a 
tightening of the financial constraintμ . 
 Combine  equations  (21) and (22) in Section II and solve for 1 K  and RER0 in terms 











,                                     (29) 














,                                     (30) 
 
where, for notational simplicity, we set  1. υ μ ≡ + The unique positive equilibrium results 
from the following inequalities: 
 
(i) 0 X d α λ > , because FC is steeper than AD (y-intercept in Figure 1, Section II). 
(ii)λ υα > , because FC is steeper than AD (x-intercept in Figure 1, Section II). 
And finally,  
(iii) 0 0 Xd υ −> , where the sign of the inequality follows directly from combining (i) and 
(ii). 
 
First, we are interested in the effect of a tightening of the financial constraint on 
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μμ <  
 
The next step is to figure out if trade (i.e., X ) ameliorates or strengthens the effects 

















,       (32) 
 
where the sign of the inequality follows from (iii). Therefore, more trade (i.e., high X ) 




words, when there is a tightening, the ensuing contraction in investment (and thereby 
output) will be dampened if X is higher.
55 In short, closedness amplifies the effect of 
shocks on investment and output). 
 
(B)  Proof that defaulting on the outstanding debt ( 0 d ) “eases the pain” in the 
aftermath of a tightening of the financial constraint. 
 
  In the model outlined in Section II, debt repudiation brings along an immediate 
increase in investment (i.e., it “eases the pain”) because it frees-up resources that would 
otherwise go to pay back the inherited debt. This result holds even if there are sanctions in 
the aftermath of default, as long as sanctions are not big enough to prevent default (i.e., 
with sanctions, the borrower does not end up paying more than what it would have paid if 
she did not default). The critical element is that default ultimately reduces the inherited 
















,                  (33) 
 
where the sign of the inequality follows from (ii).  
 
(C)  Computing the Probability of a Sudden Stop. 
 
For a particular realization of the random variable “υ ” (i.e., “the offer”), the 
borrower rejects it if  11
AR NN < , where  1
A N  is the net worth attainable to borrowers in 
11 t +=if they accept the offer, and  1
R N  is the net worth attainable if they reject it. If 
follows from equation (16) in Section II that, 
 
11
RR NY α =                                               (34) 
 
To see why, note if the borrowers reject the offer, there is no new lending ( 0 0 d = ), so  1
R N  
is just the return to capital in 11 t +=. In turn, from equation (9) in Section II, we know that 
11 ()
RR YK
α = . And from equation (30), it follows that  10
R KY α = . Therefore,  1
R N  ultimately 
depends only on  0 Y  and α , but not on υ . 
 Instead,  1
A N  is more complicated. When an offer is accepted there is new lending 
taking place. Thus, it follows from equation (16) in Section II that,  
 
11 1 1
AA N Y RER d α =−  ,                                    (35) 
 
where  11 ()
AA YK
α = , and from equation (14) in Section II, 
                                                 











= ,                                                (36) 
 
from equation (20) in Section II, plus the assumption that  11 t + = is the last period (so there 











,                                      (37) 
 












,                             (38) 
 
Therefore, we can re-write  1
A N  as follows: 
 
11 () ( )
AA NK














. Recall that we are assuming that the entrepreneurs are never insolvent 
(i.e.,  1 0
A N ≥ ), therefore φ  is always bounded above by α . Consequently, for analytical 
simplicity, from now on we treat it as a positive constant. We use (30) to re-write  1
















,                            (40) 
 
where ( ) 0 ϕ αφ ≡−> . Note that, unlike 1
R N , the net worth attainable to entrepreneurs 
when they accept an offer (i.e.,  1
A N ) does depend on the value of υ  (i.e., the generosity of 







A Xd dN X
Y







,     (41) 
 
where the sign of the inequality follows from (i) and (ii). In words, more generous offers 
that are accepted lead to higher net worth. 
In summary, while  1
R N  is constant, 1
A N  is monotonically increasing inυ . Therefore, 
given a set of values for the exogenous variables (including X ) a country will default (and 
suffer a sudden stop) every time that the realization of the random variable υ  is below a 
threshold
* υ . This threshold is such that, as seen in Figure 4 in Section II,  11




Therefore, we can explicitly solve for threshold 
* υ by setting these two equations 
equal and solving for the unknown.
56 We begin by setting 11















,                     (42) 
 























≡Λ, where by construction,  α Λ > .
57 Therefore, the threshold 














,                                       (44) 
 
where  0 α λλ −< Λ −<. 
The threshold 
* υ is needed to compute the probability of a sudden stop ( ( ) PS S ). If 
* υ υ < , then  11
RA NN >  and consequently there is a sudden stop. Therefore,  ( ) PS S is the 
probability that 





()P r o b ( ) ( ) PS S f d
υ
υ υυ υ =< = ∫ ,               (45) 
 
where ( ) f υ is the p.d.f. of υ . Since υ  is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the 
support (1,2),
58 then, 
                                                 
56 It is easy to show that the equilibrium is unique. Note that when μ=0 (there is no new lending), the 
difference between  1
A N  and  1
R N  is that the former includes the payment of the inherited debt while the 
latter does not. Therefore, it must be true that when there is no new lending,  1
R N  >  1
A N . Since  1
R N  
is constant, but 1
A N is monotonically increasing, then they can intersect at only one point, the threshold 
* υ .  
57 To see this, note that that if α ϕ = , then  α Λ = . Therefore, any values α ϕ >  yields the result that 
α Λ> . 
















=< = − = = −
+Λ −
,        (46) 
 

















.               (47) 
 
Note that because  0 λ Λ− < and  α Λ > , the probability is (as it should be) less than 1. 
Next, by computing the partial derivative of  ( ) PS S with respect to  X  we verify 















.        (48) 
 
This result leads to a testable implication of the model: all in all, economies that trade less 
are more prone to sudden stops in capital flows. On a similar vein, countries with more 















.         (49) 
 
 
(D)  The P(SS) with chi-squared distributed random shocks. 
 
In section II the P(SS) is derived under the assumption that μ  is either uniformly or 
exponentially distributed. Here it is shown that the results generalize to other possible 
distributions too. For example assume that μ  has a chi-squared distribution with mean 1-
* μ . Thus,  
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                                (51) 
where  ϒ  is the incomplete gamma function. Even though we can not get an easily 
interpretable solution for ( ) PS S , we can approximate it numerically. Figure A.1 plots the 
relationship between ( ) PS S and * μ  for different possible values of * μ , which is shown to 
be monotonically increasing. 














Therefore as  * μ  is, in turn, a decreasing function exposure to trade, it follows that 




A.5. Additional Regressions 
Table A.5.0: Instrumental Variables Linear Regressions 








0.13   
(0.06)** 
0.1   
(0.03)*** 



















(0.020)     
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 






0.09    
(0.05)*     0.03   
(0.04) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 (1) 
0.037   
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.032)    0.028 




0.028   
(0.028) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 (2) 
   -0.07 
(0.108)       
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
    0.011 
( 0.012)      
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 
















FDI/GDP t-1       -0.0003 
(0.003)      
Ln Reserves in 
Months of Imports t-1 
     -0.0014 
(0.004)      
Ln GDP  
per capita t-1 












0.014   
(0.01) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
  0.007 
(0.02) 










0.007   
(0.015) 
Regional Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 














-0.063   
(0.08) 
Obs.  1040  705 215 559 747 914  1458  1176 
R
2  0.04 0.06  0.2  0.08 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 
 Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
 *** Statistically Significant at 1% / ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically Significant at 10% 
 
Table A.5.1: Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions 
(Alternative Sudden Stop Definitions) 















  (0.22) 
























  (1.21)*** 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES YES YES YES 








Obs.  1040 1040 1040 1040 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *** Statistically Significant at 1% / ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically 
Significant at 10% 
As indicated in Appendix A.1., I use four alternative definitions of sudden stops. “SS2” and “SS3” are conceptually equivalent to “SS1”, 
but are more restrictive in that they capture fewer episodes. “SS4” is, instead, equivalent to “SS1” but is less restrictive in that classifies as 





Table A.5.2: Pooled OLS Regressions  
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
Closedness t 
0.024   
(0.013)* 
0.038   
(0.02)** 
0.19   
(0.06)** 






















-0.013   
(0.019)     
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 




0.119   
(0.0974) 
0.067 
(0.052)     0.026  
(0.039) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(1) 
0.022   
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.030)    0.029    




0.0312   
(0.028) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
    -0.06 
(0.09)       
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
    0.007   
(0.01)      
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 
-0.22   
(0.07)** 














FDI/GDP t-1       -0.0009   
(0.0019)      
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
     0.0008   
(0.0033)      
Ln GDP  
per capita t-1 
  0.003 
(0.014) 
0.082   
(0.044)* 











Government  t 
  0.005  
(0.022) 










0.003   
(0.014) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
constant  -0.0013  
(0.014) 




0.084   
(0.118) 
0.0007   
(0.1076) 




-0.081   
(0.079) 
Obs.
  1122  745 219 599 787 961  1534  1235 
R
2  0.04 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  





Table A.5.3: Ordinary Tobit Regressions (cross-section) 


























Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  






























per capita          0.0001 
(0.0002) 
Effectiveness of 





Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES 












Obs.  114  81 81 67 56 56 
Pseudo  R2  0.10 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 
Number of 
Sudden Stops  36 26 26 23 23 23 
All independent variables are year averages for the period 1970-2002. 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% / ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically Significant at 10% 
 
Table A.5.4: IV Tobit Regressions (cross-section) 


























Short Term Debt/ 






























per capita         0.0001 
(0.0002) 
Effectiveness of 





Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES 












Obs.  104  74 74 62 53 53 
Number of Sudden 
Stops  36 26 26 23 23 23 
All independent variables are year averages for the period 1970-2002. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  





Table A.5.5: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (stacked by decades) 
  Dependent Variable: Number of Sudden Stops between per decade 



































    0.32 
(0.59) 
0.16 
(0.14)     
Liability 














per capita  t-1 





Dummies?  YES  YES YES YES YES  YES 












Obs.  90  90 45 45 66  66 
R2  0.11  0.17 0.21 0.28 0.12  0.20 
All independent variables are decade averages. 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% /  ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically Significant at 10% 
 
 
Table A.5.5(b): Implied changes in the probability of sudden stops 




















Probability of a 
positive outcome 
0.2  0.12 0.17 0.13 0.23  0.15 
Δ(PSS)  15%  15% 18% 14% 15%  12% 
Δ(PSS)  = the change in the probability of a sudden stop given by a 10 percentage point  increase in closedness (i.e., an increase of  0.10 
in the independent variable). It is computed by multiplying the marginal effect (first row in Table A.5.5.) by 0.10 and diving by the 
probability of a positive outcome. 